Swiss American Historical Society Review
Volume 35

Number 1

Article 3

2-1999

The Miraculous Island of Switzerland in the Midst of the Third
Reich
H. Dwight Page

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review
Part of the European History Commons, and the European Languages and Societies Commons

Recommended Citation
Page, H. Dwight (1999) "The Miraculous Island of Switzerland in the Midst of the Third Reich," Swiss
American Historical Society Review: Vol. 35 : No. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol35/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Swiss American Historical Society Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive.
For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Page: The Miraculous Island of Switzerland in the Midst of the Third Re

I.
The Miraculous Island of Switzerland in the Midst of the Third Reich
H. Dwight Page

In the film version of Hermann Wouk's War and Remembrance, the Polish Jewish professor
Aaron Jastrow and his American Jewish niece Nathalie fall into the trap of the monstrous Nazi
genocidal machine and are interned at Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia. 1 Upon their arrival there,
they are initially treated with brutality until Professor Jastrow reminds their Nazi captors, "We are
under Swiss protection." Thereafter, they receive noticeably better treatment. Although Aaron Jastrow
later perishes in a gas chamber at Auschwitz, Nathalie owes her own escape from the same camp and
her eventual rescue by the Americans at Weimar, Germany in April, 1945 to the intervention of Swiss
diplomacy. Just as Gibbons tells us that a mysterious veil hid the operations of the early Christian
Church from the cruel pagan Romans, so did Swiss diplomatic papers mysteriously veil the escape of
thousands of European Jews like Nathalie from the incessantly probing eyes of the Gestapo. Using a
literary analogy more appropriate for this article's Germanic theme, the travel visas issued by Swiss
embassies in the various countries occupied by Nazi Germany shielded Jews from arrest in much the
same way that the slain dragon's magical blood in which Siegfried bathed made that legendary
German knight's body invulnerable in Das Nibelungenlied. German Nazis doing their utmost to kill
Jews, while their German Swiss brethren were doing their utmost to save them: all the pathos of the
Second World War is symbolized by these diametrically opposed enterprises conducted by the same
racial family.
Is it possible for a national state to exemplify so powerfully Christ-like goodness that it can
overcome evil? The Swiss Confederation certainly showed other nations the way to such an optimal
union between the visible human nation and the invisible perfect Kingdom of God by its conduct
during the Second World War. Not only did it serve as a safe haven for Nazi gold, it also served as a
safe haven for countless refugees who sought protection from the Nazi madness within its borders
during those awful times.
During the war years, the Swiss Confederation demonstrated that it deserved its reputation as
the home of the International Red Cross. It accepted 60,000 foreign children as guests. It gave shelter
1
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to 104,000 foreign troops. It provided an oasis of safety for 1,600 downed American airmen and
thousands of escapees from German and Italian prison camps (Whittlesey 53). It protected 66,000
citizens of neighboring states. It gave asylum to 65,000 refugees, of whom 29,000 were Jewish. Some
Swiss banks also aided Jewish refugees by holding the funds of organizations such as the Geneva
branch of the World Jewish Congress that ran rescue and relief operations. Altogether, the Swiss
Confederation offered asylum to 295,000 foreigners between 1939 and 1945 (Rings 315)2. This
assistance cost the Confederation nearly 200 million francs. Under the auspices of a project known as
the Swiss Donation for War Victims, the Confederation offered an additional 200 million francs to
refugees between 1944 and 1948, an amount comparable in terms of percentage to the US
contribution to Europe under the Marshall Plan.
Wartime Switzerland was a country that defended its free and democratic system under the
most difficult circumstances. In the midst of the National Socialist and fascist barbarity, here was a
small country in the heart of Europe that protected free speech and insisted on the right to hold free
and open elections. The Switzerland of that time was an anti-Nazi, open democracy, the only one in
Central Europe (Defago C2).
The Swiss government likewise gave extremely valuable assistance to the Allies during and
after the war. It demonstrated consistently an attitude of laissez-faire to Allied intelligence activities
(Lebor 245). The Swiss were careful not to offend the Germans, but they did what they could to help
the Allies. They sent them precision instruments from the Swiss watch industry. They smuggled to
them plans and instruction manuals so that the Allies could start up their own production of these
items (Schaffner 1123 ). Swiss authorities turned a blind eye to illegal Allied intelligence operations
such as tapping telephones~ intercepting letters and telegrams.· They allowed Jewish organizations
such as the World Jewish Congress and the US War Refugee Board to freely operate, rescuing and
aiding Jewish refugees escaping from the Nazis. There was quiet collaboration with Allen Dulles, the
American head of Operation Savehaven in Bern. Switzerland was the site of clandestine negotiations
during 1944 between senior Nazi and Jewish officials that slowed down the last stages of the
Holocaust. During the war years Switzerland developed progressive social reforms which were to be
widely imitated in post-war Western Europe (Church 7). In addition, as Thomas Mann stresses in his
"Letter on Switzerland," the German-speaking part of Switzerland served as the last refuge of true
German cultural traditions after those traditions had been grotesquely distorted by the Nazis in
Germany and Austria (Gut 1). Finally, the scandal which recently erupted because of the Nazi sale of
1.64 billion Swiss francs worth of gold to Swiss banks during the war must be put in proper
perspective: after all, the Allies did themselves sell over three billion Swiss francs worth of gold to the
same Swiss banks, almost twice as much as the Nazi amount. Swiss aid was clearly indispensable for
the success of the Allied war effort.

2
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Switzerland's pivotal role as a secure base for Allied wartime banking and espionage
operations was made possible by the Swiss government's and citizenry's truly extraordinary planning
and organizational skills. In Mein Kampf Adolf Hitler had made it clear that one of his highest
priorities was to reassemble all Germanic nations under a single government. Naturally, Germanspeaking Switzerland fell into that category. In fact, in Nazi textbooks of the era Switzerland was
presented in illustrations as a legitimate Gau of Grossdeutschland. Yet, despite the Ftihrer's maniacal
determination to assimilate Switzerland into the Third Reich and despite Switzerland's proximity to
the vast Nazi empire, the Swiss Federal Council and Parliament managed to extinguish German
National Socialism in Switzerland with remarkable swiftness. The Swiss Nazi party, known as the

Frontisten, never included more than 9,200 members, in other words 1.5% of the voting population
(Rings 92). In order to emphasize their abhorrence of Nazism, the Swiss tacitly agreed during the war
years to avoid the use of Hochdeutsch; those who thoughtlessly used Hochdeutsch on public trolleys
or on the street were to be treated with overt contempt and animosity (Schltier 35). Swiss police
maintained files on all dangerous and suspicious Nazis in the country, and in Zurich warrants for
their arrest were kept in constant readiness; only the date of arrest needed to be stamped on them
(Rings 293). During the early course of the war, on November 19th, 1940, the Parliament in fact
exercised this legal prerogative and ordered the dissolution of the Nazi party and its ancillary
organizations throughout the entire Swiss Confederation. 131 persons, including all Nazi party
leaders in Switzerland, were immediately arrested (Rings 301-302). This date marks the end of
official Nazi party operations in Switzerland. In general, the Swiss population

remained

extraordinarily patriotic throughout the war: only eighty-three army officers were described in police
reports as fascists; only seven of these were ever brought to trial, and only 1,360 Swiss Germans
preferred to desert into the Third Reich (Rings 303 ).
In the political arena, there occurred in Switzerland just prior to the war in 1938 one of the
most amazing events in political history. In order to generate domestic stability and prosperity and in
order to present united resistance to the Nazi menace, the various Swiss political parties voluntarily
decided to renounce partisan politics and to cooperate with one another for the duration of the war.
This unprecedented act of Swiss patriotism and altruism is known in German as die Wende (Rings
140). In addition, in July 1937 an agreement was reached among Swiss working groups effectively
outlawing all labor strikes. Like die Wende, this decision was also dictated by Swiss workers' desire to
unite the nation against the Nazis.
These selfless acts were indispensable prerequisites for the establishment of sufficient
domestic economic and social stability to make it possible for the Swiss to host foreign troops,
refugees and Allied spies. The country's stability was further strengthened by the remarkable success
of Hans Schaffner, Minister of Trade, in quelling social unrest through the implementation of an
optimal foreign trade policy (Schltier 39). While all its neighbors were occupied by the Nazis, Swiss
society retained sufficient stability and autonomy for General Guisan to order in April 1941 a
campaign for the enlightenment of the civil population. 448,000 Swiss citizens attended more than
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three thousand two-day courses and lectures offered by experts on the global crisis and domestic
defense (Rings 307). Secondly, despite the recent world-wide Great Depression, the Swiss government
was able to collect from the cantons and private non-active citizens more than a billion Swiss francs in
assistance for the families of Swiss soldiers on active duty. In those days, this law was a revolutionary
political and humanitarian measure. Thirdly, Switzerland was successful in its efforts during the war
years to become more economically self-reliant. It dug for its own coal to compensate for its heavy
dependency upon German coal; it planted public parks with grain and potato fields. Potato and grain
harvests consequently doubled. Indeed, Switzerland was the only European country which never
reduced its supply of potatoes and vegetables to its people between 1939 and 1945 (Rings 388). It
was owing to these extremely prosperous and well coordinated conditions that Allied spies were able
to function so effectively with their Swiss colleagues and foreign refugees were able to enjoy Swiss
hospitality during the Second World War.
Who we1e the leading Swiss philanthropists in the cast of characters in this drama of Swiss
wartime resistance against the Nazis? Such a list would include Hermann Boschenstein, an editor of
the Basler Nachrichten; Gertrud Kurz, who sought to liberalize Swiss refugee asylum laws; Regina
Kagi-Fuchsmann, who assisted refugees in her role as the director of the Swiss Workers' Assistance
Union; Pastor Paul Vogt, who exhorted his compatriots to seek the extreme resort of civil
disobedience in order to protect and to conceal refugees illegally hiding in Switzerland; Bundesrat
Albert Oeri, who appealed to his fellow lawmakers in the Parliament in September 1942 to
demonstrate more human compassion and less concern for economic considerations in their dealings
with foreign refugees; the border patrol officer Paul Grtininger who between August and December
1938 allowed 3,600 Jews entry into Switzerland and altered their papers to permit their resettlement
there; Jean-Marie Musy, a former Swiss president responsible for the release of 1,210 Jews from
Theresienstadt on board the Musy train, which reached Montreux in February 1945; Rene Cuttat, the
chancellor of the Swiss consulate in Lyon who clandestinely brought French Jews threatened by the
Gestapo into Switzerland; Frederick Born, a Swiss Red Cross representative in Budapest who saved
three thousand Jewish lives; and finally Karl Lutz, the Swiss diplomat who issued protection papers to
and saved the lives of more than 62,000 Jews in Budapest during the summer of 1944, at the height
of the Hungarian Holocaust.
The above mentioned historical facts comprise the salient points in the defense of Swiss
conduct during the Second World War. The scholar does detect however three major ethical problems
as he surveys the entire corpus of scholarship dealing with the Swiss role in that conflict, - the issue of
Swiss refugee politics, the financial dealings with the Third Reich, and the settlement of Holocaust
victims' bank accounts.
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The Issue of Refugee Politics

First, and especially troublesome to our conscience, is the fact that Swiss border police,
instructed by Bern, rejected the application for asylum of some 30,000 Jewish refugees during the
war's course. What is the explanation for this decision which most Swiss people in 1999 perceive as
ethically abhorrent? It is imperative that we understand that the wartime Swiss Parliament was
barraged by a flood of diversified advice from throughout the homeland and from abroad. These
ranged from the purely humanitarian view point advocated by the Swiss historian Edgar Bonjour to
the extremely cautious, protectionist, heartless stance of Eugen Bircher, chief of the Swiss medical
mission, General Guisan and Heinrich Rothmund, chief of the Confederation's police division at that
time. Edgar Bonjour reminded his people of the glorious tradition of Swiss humanitarianism: there
were cantons which once spent one fifth of public income for the upkeep of refugees, they imposed a
special refugee tax to cover the costs of these unfortunate people. As Bonjour put it, "our integral
neutrality pledges us to integral humanity" (Rings 336).
The Parliament's apparently callous decision to seal the borders against all civilian refugees in
August, 1942 was essentially dictated by its understandable deference to the advice it was receiving at
the time from Heinrich Rothmund. One will more readily appreciate the government's respect for Dr.
Rothmund's opinion when one considers that Dr. Rothmund, who has been for decades falsely
identified as the author of the notorious J-stamp on German passports used to identify Jewish
travelers to Switzerland, based upon an erroneous March, 1954 article published by Dr. Peter
Rippmann, has recently been rehabilitated. The research of Dr. Max Keller proves conclusively that it
was not Heinrich Rothmund, but rather the German ambassador Kocher, who was responsible for the
implementation of the J-stamp (Keller 3).
Dr. Rothmund was moreover deemed to be the government's most learned expert in the field
of refugee policy. He understood better than any other public official the nature of the Swiss job
market, and was therefore in the best professional position to make a judgment about how much
stress the domestic Swiss job market could take from competition by foreign guest workers.
Rothmund's research had indicated that it would be extremely difficult to assimilate into the limited
Swiss job market the millions of Eastern European Jews who could have conceivably crossed into
Switzerland if its borders had remained open. He therefore established as his office's highest priority
the prevention of irreparable damage to the Swiss job market by the infiltration of an excessive
number of foreign refugees (Rings 322). Contemporary events corroborated Rothmund's conclusions: within two weeks of the Anschluss of Austria by the Nazis, three thousand of Austria's
180,000 Jews had already crossed the border into Switzerland. This huge influx of newcomers into
Swiss society occurred at a time when the nation was ill prepared to assimilate them into its economy,
for 120,000 Swiss nationals were themselves unemployed in their own homeland (Rings 81). In
addition, the gap between wages and prices in the country continued to grow during the war years
(Church 9). Groceries were rationed, there were shortages of textiles, gas and coal, and there was little
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electricity. Not only Switzerland but all of Austria's neighbors reacted to this threat to their national
economic and employment security by immediately imposing new strict visa requirements for all
refugees reaching their national frontiers. Further corroborating Rothmund's caveat against asylum
for refugees were General Guisan's regular alarming messages to the Parliament, claiming that the
presence of a large number of foreign refugees on Swiss soil would jeopardize national military
security and lead to serious shortages of food and supplies. Those Swiss politicians in the RothmundGuisan anti-refugee camp justified their actions by comparing Switzerland to a small lifeboat already
filled to capacity. The boat's captain had to make the heart-wrenching decision to push away
drowning men so as not to capsize the boat and kill all those under his immediate care. The reader
can now perhaps better appreciate the logic behind the Parliament's decision to close the Swiss border
to all civilian applicants for asylum on August 10th, 1942.
Nonetheless, the Swiss Parliament did show itself to be simultaneously amenable to the voice
of compassion and humanitarianism. Thirteen days later, on August 23rd, 1942, this same legislative
body repealed the laws on asylum and significantly ameliorated the restrictions on applications.
Notably, under the new law, children, the elderly and families with infants were to be given preference
for admission into the country.
The government's rapid change of heart was much influenced by two events. First, during the
spring and summer of 1942, the Swiss Parliament was receiving a steady stream of reliable disturbing
reports about the horrors of the Holocaust. As early as March, 1942, a report concerning the mass
execution of Jews in the neighborhood of Smolensk, Russia, written by Dr. Bucher and Anton Weber,
two Swiss physicians attending wounded German soldiers on the Russian front, was made available. In
July, 1942 Swiss newspapers published the proclamation of the Polish government-in-exile that
400,000 Poles had been executed and one and a half million more had been deported to death camps
(Rings 327). One of the Swiss government's own employees, an adjunct of the police division Robert
Jezlar, confirmed the Holocaust and formally informed his superiors in the Parliament of its reality
on July 30th, 1942. Two days later, on August 1st, 1942, the report of a credible German industrialist
in Geneva gave irrefutable evidence of the Final Solution: he informed the Swiss government of the
decision taken at the Wannsee Conference of January 20th, 1942 to exterminate by means of gas all
eleven million Jews in Europe. Finally, on August 8th, 1942, Gerhart Riegner, the World Jewish
Congress' representative in Geneva, sent a telegram, known as the Riegner Cable, to Sidney Silverman,
an MP in London, and to Stephen Wise, the president of the American Jewish Congress, verifying the
true extent of the Holocaust (Lebor 35).
Secondly, a flood of newspaper articles and letters from the public demanded the repeal of
the law blocking refugees' entry into Switzerland. The public's vociferous outcry for justice and
humanity was most poignantly expressed by two of Switzerland's most compassionate humanitarians,
Gertrud Kurz and Pastor Paul Vogt. Gertrud Kurz personally visited the federal delegate in charge of
Swiss refugee policy, Edmund von Steiger, at his vacation home in Mont Pelerin on the Sunday
following the passing of the August 10th anti-refugee law and, while the three hour conversation is
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not recorded, it is clear from ensuing events that the Swiss politician was much moved by her appeal
for Christian compassion for the Jews. In fact, this conversation marks the historical turning point in
the Swiss government's attitude toward the Jewish question. Upon Gertrud Kurz' s return from Mont
Pelerin to Bern, a crowd of her compatriots yearning to emulate her Christ-like goodness was awaiting
her at the Bern central station, eager to discover the outcome of her dialogue with Federal Councilor
von Steiger. Unfortunately, Gertrud Kurz had to disappoint her countrymen with news of the
government's hesitation to change its mind. Von Steiger had requested an additional day to consider
the refugee matter. However, events of the following day were to prove the extraordinary power of
the Christian faith to do good: on that date a conference of the Swiss Central Committee for Aid to
Refugees was held in Zurich. Frau Kurz and Pastor Vogt were both in attendance, indomitable as ever,
pleading for mercy for the Jews. The conference lasted the entire day. How heart wrenching it would
have been to witness these Swiss Christians begging for pity for the desperate Jews, as Heinrich
Rothmund and his colleagues, also present, sat observing their compassionate countrymen with
obdurate stone faces. Despite these Christian Good Samaritans' pleas , Rothmund refused to relent.
Nonetheless, at the day's end Rothmund received a mysterious phone call from his superior von
Steiger, whose conscience had apparently been awakened by Gertrud Kurz and who announced the
government's new decision to repeal the border controls and to consider each applicant for asylum on
an individual basis (Rings 335). This was to be the greatest victory for Swiss Christianity during the
war.
The Swiss Parliament's miraculous about-face regarding the August 10th anti-asylum law was
only the beginning of a series of policy changes demonstrating its sincere commitment to the
implementation of the ethical imperatives of the Christian faith. During the fall and winter of 194243 the National Parliament in Bern resembled the School of Athens in Raphael's famous fresco in the
Vatican Museum. Just as in Raphael's fresco, Aristotle and Plato tutor a group of eager Athenian
pupils in the arts of political science and ethics, so did the Swiss academic giants in the field of
theology tutor the inquisitive and intellectually open politicians of Bern. The subjects of debate in the
Swiss Parliament in those days were as much theology and ethics as politics and economics.
It was the golden age of Swiss theology. Karl Barth, the greatest theologian of the twentieth
century, was teaching in the Department of Theology at the University of Basel. The distinguishing
characteristic of Professor Barth's theology is its marked political orientation: whereas nineteenth
century theology had been either individualistic (Schleiermacher) or bourgeois (Ritschl) or both
(Kierkegaard), Barthian theology was always specifically socialist (Hunsinger 224). From 1909 to
1931, Barth was consistently concerned about theory for the sake of praxis, never about theory in
itself. Every major development in his theology took place within a political context. His break with
theological liberalism in 1915, his break with religious socialism in 1919, and his break with
dialectical theology after 1928 can only be fully understood in light of the outbreak of the First
World War, the Russian Revolution of 1917-18 and the rise of Nazism, respectively. In each case, it
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was a political crisis which compelled Barth to rethink the conceptual basis of his theology; in each
case, he was seeking a better intellectual basis for his social action.
Barth's mature theology, as it is expressed in Church Dogmatics, leads directly and inevitably
to radical political ethics (Bettis 161). According to the Barthian point of view, all human action
stands under God's command and has a character of either obedience or disobedience to divine
authority as expressed in Holy Scripture. No human action is free; all human decisions are governed
by clear ethical imperatives, which we choose to obey or to disobey. If people refuse to acknowledge
the hegemony of these intrinsic divine laws, they have already committed themselves to their own
superiority over everything else. This prideful refusal is, according to Barth, one of the basic
components of sin and one of the basic causes of social problems.
Barth felt that, if people were completely serious about God all along the line, social problems
would be solved (Busch 80). He was certain that serious study of the Holy Bible and Christian ethics
would serve as a panacea for the social ills afflicting mankind. He sought to unify church dogmatics
and ethics in an effort to find a practical method to improve society; this was Barth's essential
contribution to the field of theological inquiry. Barth insisted that the gospel is directly relevant to
every political act (Bettis 173). The Christian Church stands under the gospel's demand to be a social
revolutionary force; she must hold high the banner of the gospel's revolutionary social transformation. Ecclesia achieves such welcome social improvements through the teaching of Christian
ethics. For Barth ethics should be used by politicians to make daily choices in the real socio-political
world; ethics is concerned with changing the world for the better (Bettis 170). In the Dogmatics he
develops four criteria for defining ethical behavior in order to assist the politician to make correct
ethical choices.
At present, the state and politics are based upon a conflict of social interests -- the class
conflict. Witness to God can only be given by a church that stands in the class struggle against the
class system, by a church that wants to eliminate the class system, not preserve it: the socialist
movement is a "reflection" of God's Kingdom (Gollwitzer 111). Barth looks forward to and expects a
better world for men and women to live in. He expects that world to come through a radical and
revolutionary change in the present dehumanizing socio-political structure. That combination of
utopian vision and revolutionary method qualify him as a major force in the struggle for socialist
humanism (Bettis 177).
Not only did Professor Barth seek to relate theology and politics on the theoretical plane, he
put this politico-theological synthesis into daily practice. He was an avid reader of political literature;
his cellar was full of such documents (Hunsinger 181). In 1915 he had joined the most leftist Swiss
party of the time, the Social Democratic, and he remained active in the party's left wing. During his
Safenwil pastorate (1911-21) he established three labor unions, organized strikes, and traveled up and
down Switzerland as a party speaker (Gollwitzer 78).
As the war years approached, · Professor Barth's direct influence upon Swiss and German
politics increased. With his book on Anselm, Barth turned from dialectical to analogical theology and
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provided a positive basis for the church's resistance to Hitler (Hunsinger 220). He formally protested
against German National Socialism by becoming a member of the Social Democratic Party on May
1st, 1931. During the summer semester of 1933 his lectures in Germany on John, the Evangelist,
attracted not only German divinity students in droves but also large groups of local Nazis. His lecture
in Berlin on October 30th, 1933, entitled "Reformation as Decision" attracted a full house, even
though it had not been advertised in any newspaper.
After he had been forced to resign his position at the divinity school at the University of
Bonn and had taken up residency in Basel, Barth began to have even more direct influence upon the
political events of the day. He proclaimed that Nazism was a transgression of the first commandment.
He looked out for jobs for emigres to Switzerland, put up Jews at his home, and wrote letters to
Bishop Bell of Chichester, Bishop Eidem of Uppsala, and Marc ~oegner in Paris, asking for the
reception of Jews in other countries. Along with Pastor Paul Vogt, he assisted the Swiss Evangelical
Society for Aid to the Confessing Church in Germany, which became an enterprise more and more
involved in the care of Jews and Jewish Christians who had been expelled or had escaped from
Germany. He became a member of a secret organization for Swiss defense in case of invasion, the
National Resistance Movement. His membership in this group enabled him to converse regularly with
the president of the Swiss Social Democratic Party, Dr. Hans Oprecht (Busch 308).
Barth gave an especially influential series of lectures in Liestal, Basel, Wettwil, St. Gallen,
Neuchatel, Lausanne and Geneva, titled "Our Church and Switzerland at the Present Time," in which
he issued an urgent summons to Swiss citizens to do everything in their power for the preservation of
a free Switzerland. When Bundesrat Edmund von Steiger reprimanded him in June, 1941 for his
intervention in politics, Barth protested against the assumption that political decisions could be
separated from theology. Thus, von Steiger's aforementioned conversation with Gertrud Kurz on the
refugee question in August, 1942 was not the first occasion on which the Swiss politician was forced
to meditate upon the ethics which should govern Swiss wartime policies. Indeed, von Steiger had had
much experience in the field of ethics, for during his student days in Bern, he had been the most
vigorous opponent of his fellow student Karl Barth in the students' debating society known as
"Zofingia" (Busch 35). Von Steiger's close association with theologians and his formal training in
ethical inquiry clearly served him well as he was making the vital decision to reverse government
policy on the refugee question in August, 1942, in order to adopt a more humanitarian way of
dealing with those seeking wartime asylum in Switzerland.
Most importantly, on July 6th, 1941, Barth gave a lecture, titled "In the Name of God the
Almighty," to an audience of more than two thousand members of the Young Church in Gwatt on
Lake Thun, and on July 13th to a considerable Romansch audience in Vaumarcus. In this speech
Barth offered strong criticisms of the exploitation of the economically weak, of the failure to have
socialist representatives in the government, of restrictions on the freedom of press and freedom of
speech, of the curtailment of the right of sanctuary, and of the lively trade between the Swiss and the
Axis powers (Busch 310). The last part of the speech aroused exceptional attention in Bern. Barth
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sent it to General Guisan and to the Confederacy's President. Printing was arranged so secretly that
16,000 copies of the lecture were already in circulation when it was banned on July 18th, for there
were people among the censors and on the army staff who welcomed Barth's views and who were
secretly able to circumvent actions taken against the publication of his address.
In general, Professor Barth was exceptionally involved in Swiss wartime politics. He called
personally on Heinrich Rothmund to lodge an appeal on behalf of a number of immigrants. At St.
Rosengarten by Gerzensee, the estate of his friend Dr. Albert von Erlach, Professor Barth had the
opportunity to converse with Federal councilors, foreign ambassadors, and General Guisan himself.
He took advantage of these opportunities to remind these politicians of their ethical responsibilities
and especially their duty to recognize and to defend the paramount importance of reverence for life
(Busch 319).
In addition to receiving advice from the era's most eminent theologians, delegates in the
wartime Swiss Parliament were receiving a flood of mail from outraged constituents and ministers
demanding greater compassion for the Jews. The Archbishops of Canterbury, York and Wales joined
the delegates' countrymen's appeals to rescue the persecuted Jewish people (Rings 339). When the
delegates finished their workday, their lessons in ethics continued in the privacy of their homes, for
there they read in their newspapers and heard on their radios additional editorial appeals for
charitable concern for the Jewish question. Indeed, the voice of Christian compassion and
brotherhood reverberated loudly throughout the entire Swiss Confederation during the final months
of 1942 and the opening months of 1943.
This salutary process of moral introspection culminated in the Swiss Parliament's decision in
February, 1943 to make an explicit appeal to the various cantons to give assistance and shelter to all
refugees reaching the Swiss border (Rings 341). Only with the consent of the concerned local cantons
could the central government in Bern legally give asylum to all those requesting it.
The notorious Swiss decision to reject 30,000 Jewish refugees was ultimately dictated by
eighteen cantons' rejection of the government's appeal to assist these miserables. 3 These cantons'
refusal to comply with Bern's wishes exonerates the Swiss Parliament from complicity in the crime of
genocide. Bern had done its best to persuade the cantonal governments to help the Jews, using the
same ethical arguments by which it had itself been persuaded. But there came a point where, without
the local cantons' cooperation, Bern could legally proceed no further, given the extremely democratic
and decentralized nature of Swiss government and the constitutional right of each canton to decide
which persons it will host. Guilt for the failure to help those 30,000 lost souls must therefore always
reside with the local Swiss policy makers and magistrates who refused to cooperate with Bern on the
refugee question. Their refusal to help the Jews was ostensibly based upon their claim that their
3

The cantons which refused to comply with Bern's request to grant asylum to refugees were: Aargau, both
Appenzells, Bern, Freiburg, Geneva, Graubtinden, Luzem, Neuenburg, Ob- und Nidwalden, Schwyz, Ticino, Uri,
Valais, Vaud, Zurich, Zug.
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respective cantons did not have the financial means to do so. However, simple common sense tells
each of us that it requires little cash to give a Jewish child or a Jewish couple an extra guest room in
your home and to offer them a simple daily meal. The results of the survey conducted by the
Emmentaler Blatt in September, 1935 suggest a more sinister motive for these cantons' lack of
compassion for the Jews: 83% of the Swiss citizens responding to this survey made clearly antiSemitic remarks (Rings 317).
Financial Dealings with the Third Reich

The second great ethical issue in this controversy is: Did the Swiss Confederation have the
ethical right to sell Swiss francs in exchange for looted Nazi gold? Opponents of Swiss wartime
financial practices claim that the sale of Swiss francs to the Nazis was the principal fuel of the Nazi
genocidal machine, in that those sales made it possible for the Reich to purchase military supplies and
arms from countries such as Sweden and Po~ugal unwilling to accept German marks. Secondly, these
opponents claim that Swiss financial assistance to the Reich prolonged the war. Thirdly, these
adversaries of Swiss wartime policy claim that the Swiss knew by February 2nd, 1943, the day of the
German surrender at Stalingrad, that the Germans had lost the war and thus no longer posed a threat
to Swiss national security. They point out that, despite this knowledge of the Germans' incapacity to
carry out an invasion of Switzerland, the Federal Council told Swiss National Bank officials as late as
November, 1943 to continue to accept Nazi gold (Lebor 220). Their claim is ostensibly substantiated
by the Eizenstat Report, which maintains that the Wehrmacht no longer constituted any danger to
Switzerland after 1943. These claims can be disproven and a strong defense for the Swis.5
Confederation's wartime financial conduct can be made through proper historical inquiry. Research
shows that the Nazis had many financial resources besides the Swiss banks. It is true that Nazi
investments in Switzerland were huge. It has been determined from ledgers of the German
Reichsbank that a total of 398 million dollars worth of gold was shipped to Switzerland by the
Reichsbank between September, 1938 and May, 1945 (Lebor 67). The full extent to which the Nazi
economy was linked to Switzerland and its reliance upon Swiss partners, banks, insurance companies
and lawyers to function, is revealed by Safehaven Report #2969. This six-page document indicates
that the Third Reich participated in 358 economic enterprises in Switzerland (Lebor 143). One key
Allied intelligence document detailing the extent of Swiss financial collaboration with the Nazis, the
record of the February, 1946 interview by US military officials of Dr. Landwehr, former head of the
Foreign Exchange Department of the Nazi Economic Ministry, states that the highly reliable Dr.
Landwehr estimated that the sum of German assets that passed into Switzerland during the war
actually amounted to at least fifteen billion Reichsmark, or six billion dollars (Lebor 135). Nonetheless, one quickly perceives that the Swiss contribution to the Nazi war effort was minimal when
compared with the other economic factors sustaining the Third Reich. The Russian historian
Vyachislav I. Dashichev writes that it was actually Stalin who had made it possible for Hitler to
unleash World War II under the most favorable conditions by delivering to Germany vast amounts of
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the necessary raw materials for arms production and foodstuffs to feed the German troops. Three
other eminent historians, Jean-Fran~is Bergier, Jakob Tanner and Walther Hofer, have rejected as
untenable the allegations that Switzerland prolonged the war. From their research it emerges that
Swiss contributions were irrelevant compared to other factors: according to these reliable scholars,
Swiss arms deliveries to wartime Germany were worth 600 million francs, whereas the total German
war costs were 1.2 trillion francs. Swiss arms deliveries to Germany would thus have amounted to all
of .05%, or half of one per mil. Corroborating these findings is a memorandum from Albert Speer,
Germany's munitions czar, to Adolf Hitler, dated December, 1943. This memorandum is in essence a
priority list for Nazi purchases. Speer stresses therein to the Fuhrer, as Germany's highest priority at
the time, the necessity of the purchase of metal alloys from the Balkan region. Speer concludes that
these alloys were so vital for the sustenance of the Reich that the war would end ten months after the
German loss of the Balkans, which is exactly what happened. Yet Speer did not even mention
Switzerland in his calculations of the Reich's top priorities (Speer 329).
Further minimizing the Swiss role in the duration of World War II is the consideration of the
true causes of that conflict. Any competent professor of history is familiar with the universally
accepted causes of the Second World War to be found in any reputable history textbook: first, the
Soviet Union gave a green light for Germany's invasion of Poland with its promises of economic
assistance to the Nazis made in the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Secondly, the West' s unwillingness to give
refuge to the Jews, announced at the 1938 Evian Conference, gave a green light to Berlin to proceed
with the organization of the Holocaust (Lebor 178). Thirdly, France, England and the United States
allowed Hitler's policy of aggres~ion for all too long, giving the Nazis valuable time to build up
armed strength. FDR himself later acknowledged that the "neutrality legislation" guiding United
States foreign policy from 1935 onward only served to encourage the aggressors. Fourthly, Germany
deliberately catalyzed the war by its invasion of Poland on September 3rd, 1945. And lastly, Italy and
Japan transformed the war into a global conflict by their collaboration with the Third Reich. In
addition, competent historians universally cite as the major reason for the war's prolongation the poor
strategic and policy decisions in the Allies' conduct of the war. They cite two specific examples of ill
advised Allied strategy as the two most significant reasons for the delay in the Allied victory. First, it
was clearly the desire of Mussolini's successor regime under Marshal Badoglio to bring Italy into the
allied camp as quickly as possible. Yet bound by the formula of unconditional surrender conceived
by Roosevelt and Churchill at Casablanca, the Allies hesitated to accept Italy's proposal and allowed
Hitler to occupy the Italian peninsula himself, thus necessitating the many casualties of the bloody
Italian campaign (Fuller 264 ff). Secondly, the Allies' strategy in the war's final phase, in the fall of
1944, was flawed by bickering in the Allied High Command. Field Marshal Montgomery proposed
that all the supply lines be concentrated on one army and that the war be brought to a swift end by a
single powerful push into Germany, while General Eisenhower insisted upon his own strategy of
slowly advancing on a broad front. By the time he yielded and gave Montgomery the green light to
proceed with his own invasion plan, it was a month too late (Wilmot 557 ff). The German
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commanders von Rundstedt, Westphal, Blumentripp and Speidel later all testified that they felt that a
concentrated Allied thrust from Belgium in September, 1944 would have prevented Hitler from
launching his Ardennes offensive, would have prevented the terribly costly Battle of the Bulge, and
would have ended the war eight months earlier.
Readers will have noted that in this summation of the principal causes for the outbreak and
duration of the Second World War, generally acknowledged by professional historians, Switzerland
has not been mentioned. In fact, no serious history textbook includes Swiss activities as a significant
factor in the long duration of that conflict. Thus the Eizenstat Report's claim that Swiss actions
prolonged the war is untenable.
A further defense of the Swiss banks' decision to purchase extensively gold from the German
Reich is the fact that these gold purchases were an economic necessity, both for the survival of the
Confederation itself and for the monetary needs of the Allies. In June, 1941, the American
government seized all Swiss gold and foreign exchange holdings in the United States. In fact, until
the end of the war, the United States robbed Switzerland of the unproblematic access to a significant
part of its own resources. The loss of the Swiss gold reserves in the United States was a devastating
burden for Switzerland; the Confederation was consequently forced to purchase gold from the
German Reich, as the Swiss National Bank was obligated to keep a high gold reserve as coverage on
the bank notes it issued (Blocher 12).
Secondly, many Swiss officials, recalling the runaway inflation following World War I,
believed that gold purchases were necessary to anticipate and control inflation, arising from the
demand for Swiss francs, which increased as the war progressed (Whittlesey 55). Thirdly, the
organization of an international gold market on its own territory was an economic prerequisite for
-Switzerland's ability to respond to the international demand for its currency, particularly from the
Allies (Schaffner A23 ).
Countering the recent libelous covert and overt accusations in the press that Switzerland sold
its currency to the Nazis in order to make a profit from the war is the simple fact that, far from
profiting from financial dealings with the Reich, the disposable real income of the average Swi_ss
citizen actually dropped during the war, declining from 1772 francs in 1939 to 1636 francs in 1944
(Blocher 12). Most importantly, Werner Rings, who has written the most thorough and critical
account of Swiss wartime gold transactions with Germany. affirmed in 1985: "I have looked into the
matter and can ascertain that in the papers of the SNB I have not found the slightest evidence which
would indicate a politically motivated collaboration with the Third Reich" (Rings, Advokaten 187).
Nor is there any evidence that Switzerland ever deliberately profited from gold taken from
prisoners interned in Nazi concentration camps. even though 30% of the Nazi gold belonged to
victims of the Holocaust. Even the unusually critical Eizenstat Report draws the conclusion that there
is no proof that Switzerland or any other neutral state consciously accepted such "victim gold"
(Blocher 15).
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It is especially important to remember that the Swiss Confederation's wartime financial
conduct was essentially dictated by its status as a neutral state and its legally binding promise to obey
international law, as established at the 1907 Hague Convention. International law required that the
SNB deal equally with every country, including Germany, that wanted to buy Swiss currency. Thus
the Swiss lacked the legal basis to cut the Germans off (Schaffner A 23 ).
Moreover, wartime Switzerland was exceptionally dependent upon Germany for its economic
livelihood. Germany was then, as now, Switzerland's most important trading partner. The majority of
its imports at that time came from the German Reich. The Nazis took advantage of Switzerland's
economic dependency upon the Reich in order to extort from the country the most far reaching
concessions possible, including the sale of its currency. Swiss dependency upon the Reich increased
in the fall of 1943 when the Nazis also assumed control of Switzerland's southern border with Italy,
thereby acquiring hegemony over all import and export routes into the country.
The most compelling argument in defense of Swiss wartime banking transactions with
Germany is that a Swiss refusal to sell francs to the Nazis would have seriously compromised the
success of the Allied victory. We now know that the Nazis attributed an exceedingly high priority to
the purchase of Swiss francs and would have gone to extraordinary lengths to preserve the vital
Zurich/Basel/Berlin financial connection if anything had threatened that connection. The fifteen
billion francs worth of German assets in wartime Switzerland guaranteed Berlin's continuing attention
and determination to maintain its influence in the Swiss Confederation.
The president of the Reichsbank, Walter Funk, estimated that Germany could not survive for
more than two months without the_vital Swiss francs (Jost 753). After all, those francs were necessary
to pay arms and supply manufacturers in countries highly unwilling to accept German gold, notably
the Portuguese, Spanish and Rumanian central banks. During the war, the Swiss franc was the only
freely convertible currency in Europe. SS General Walter Schellenberg stated after the war that Berlin
had instructed him to maintain his contacts with Swiss Colonel Roger Masson at all costs: the Fiihrer's
headquarters sent Schellenberg regularly to Switzerland for two purposes, to maintain German
espionage operations there and to maintain the supply of Swiss currency to Berlin (Lebor 209). The
Red House Report further testifies to the importance of Switzerland as a Nazi banking center.
In addition, the Swiss-German economic and trading relationship was reciprocal: just as
Switzerland desperately needed German imports, so did Germany desperately need Swiss exports.
The wartime German economy depended heavily upon both the Swiss private banking system and the
Swiss precision manufacturing industries (Lebor 175). Any Swiss attempt to have terminated
diplomatic relations or economic collaboration with the Nazi regime would have catalyzed an
unacceptably high level of panic in Berlin and would have necessitated an annexation of Switzerland
to the Reich in order to restore the indispensable Swiss-German economic equilibrium.
Contrary to the Eizenstat report, we also now have much new evidence that the Nazis posed a
far greater actual threat to Swiss national security than was previously surmised. While in 1999 we
have the benefit of historical perspective and now know that the Third Reich was irrevocably crippled
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after its defeat at Stalingrad in February, 1943, the Swiss wartime government had no magical means
of predicting the eventual defeat of Germany. On the contrary, throughout the war, the Parliament in
Bern was constantly bombarded by reports from reliable sources indicating possible or probable
German invasions of the country. For example, although the Third Reich had promised to respect
Swiss neutrality, the Swiss witnessed helplessly in May, 1940 as the German Wehrmacht assaulted with
impunity Holland and Belgium, whose neutrality the Reich had likewise promised to respect. In the
same month the Reich invaded and occupied France and Luxembourg. At that time the Swiss High
Command knew that ten German army divisions were positioned just 30 kilometers from the Swiss
border, poised to attack; seven would have sufficed for a successful invasion (Rings 188). In addition,
very real plans for a German invasion of the country were definitely made by the Wehrmacht during
the summer of 1940. On June 26th, 1940 the German High Command prepared to issue orders for
an invasion of Switzerland and once again in July, 1940 officers of the German Army Group C made
operational plans for an invasion designed to prevent the fortification of the Alpine fortresses which
had just been announced to Swiss army officers at the Rtitli by General Guisan (Rings 242).
Serious threats of a Nazi invasion continued to plague the Confederation throughout the war.
The Wehrmacht's planning units and logistics officers held in constant readiness detailed maps and
plans for an invasion of Switzerland (Lebor 218). As late as March, 1943, yet another Nazi invasion
plan was launched. In January, 1943 the Viking Line, a Swiss intelligence network in Germany that
worked with anti-Nazi Wehrmacht officers, had forwarded to Colonel Masson the report of a meeting
at the Ftihrer's headquarters in October, 1942, attended by Goring, Himmler, Gobbels and Rosenberg,
at which the Nazi leaders had discussed invading Switzerland. On March 18th, 1943, the Viking Line
sent another message that the Nazis had again discussed an attack on Switzerland. Simultaneously, a
Swiss agent reported to Masson that German parachutists and mountain warfare divisions were being
prepared for an attack. This particularly terrifying threat to Swiss security became known as the
March Alert (Lebor 223). Furthermore, the Nazis were always surprising their neighbors with new
threats. News of the development of top secret missiles at Peenemtinde with which the Nazis intended
to wipe out New York and London seeped out during the spring of 1944, and the news spread terror
throughout Europe and the world as long range missiles indeed did begin to fall on London the
following summer. As late as September, 1944 Hitler amazed the globe with his resurrection of the
strength of the Wehrmacht and his renewed assault on France in the Ardennes offensive. This event is
known to history as the September Miracle. It was clearly dangerous in those days to underestimate
the power of the Third Reich, which had at its disposal not only the resources and troops from its vast
pan-European empire but also 104 billion Reichmarks in assets which it had looted from its
conquered lands (Rings 38). Against this terrifying Goliath, small Switzerland, like young David, had
to make the most of its wit and cunning.
The Nazis moreover masterminded a highly devious and effective Nervenkrieg designed to
weaken Swiss morale. It was widely believed in Berlin that such psychological warfare would
eventually make Switzerland ripe for an Anschluss to the Reich. Shortly before the war's outbreak in
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1939, Hitler directed his spies throughout Europe to spread false rumors of the existence of a Nazi
"fifth Column" which was supposedly operating in countries outside the Reich with the intent to
undermine the local governments and to supplant them with Nazi client states. Germany constantly
threatened to cut off supplies to the Swiss, in particular vital coal supplies upon which Swiss industry
and homes heavily depended for their survival (Jost 753). In his negotiations with Colonel Masson,
SS General Schellenberg was explicitly directed by Berlin to use as his main card in the political war
game being waged against Switzerland the threat of a Nazi invasion. German spies frequently
exhorted the 80,000 German citizens residing in wartime Switzerland, the largest German colony in
Europe, to rebel against Swiss authorities. Further increasing Swiss officials' nervousness and stress
was the knowledge that the Ftihrer's headquarters had proof of the extremely detailed plan of
French/Swiss military cooperation in the event of a Nazi attack on Switzerland which had been
devised by officers of the French and Swiss High Command prior to the war's outbreak. This
information had been obtained by the Nazi government from the discovery by German troops of
·secret documents in La Charite-sur-Loire, France on June 16th, 1940, in a train car carrying archives
of the French High Command. At any time the Nazis could have used this evidence of neutral
Switzerland's technically illegal military agreement with a foreign state in order to embarrass and to
blackmail the Swiss government at a time when it desperately needed the confidence of its own
people and the Allies' good will (Rings 219). Finally, in April, 1943, one of the key espionage agents
of the Swiss Viking Line was arrested in Berlin. The Swiss government thereby lost one of its main
sources of information concerning Nazi plans and strategy (Lebor 224). Thereafter the Swiss
Parliament was compelled to make foreign policy decisions based upon its own conjectures without
the benefit of access to verified information about the Reich's anticipated military maneuvers. This
new necessity, after April, 1943, to "grope in the dark" in its relations with the easily enraged Reich
clearly exacerbated the strain upon Bern as it sought to develop an optimal foreign policy during the
late war years.
Under these extraordinarily trying and unpredictable circumstances, the much criticized Swiss
policy of accommodation toward the Germans, heralded by President Pilet-Golaz's speech in May,
1940 and consummated by the Swiss-German agreement of August 9th, 1940, becomes far more
understandable. The obsequious policy toward Germany of the insular, isolated wartime Swiss
Confederation was essentially dictated by a consistent effort to preserve by whatever means the
Confederation's most precious commodity, its independence, to defend its humanitarian tradition, and
to provide sufficient food, shelter and employment for its citizens within the limitations of its wartime
economy. heavily dependent upon German imports. Above all, Swiss diplomatic policy vis-a-vis the
Reich was dictated by the determination to avoid at all costs the dreaded Nazi invasion
In concluding our survey of Swiss wartime banking activities with the Third Reich, it is
imperative to counter two major erroneous anti-Swiss claims which have appeared recently and
frequently on this subject in the press.

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sahs_review/vol35/iss1/3

16

Page: The Miraculous Island of Switzerland in the Midst of the Third Re

19

Claim One: If the Swiss had only allowed the Nazis to invade Switzerland, the Swiss franc
would have lost its value and the Nazis would have thereby been deprived of their principal source of
currency for the purchase of foreign made arms and would have been forced to surrender. The Swiss
are therefore responsible for prolonging the war and for causing the deaths of many soldiers and
civilians.
In preceding paragraphs we have already presented much historical evidence to disprove the
allegation that Swiss banking transactions with the Nazis had any significant effect upon the
prolongation of the war. With regard to the present claim that the Swiss franc, the alleged fuel of the
Nazi genocidal machine, would have lost its value pursuant to a Nazi invasion of the country, the
example of France disproves such an assertion. France was occupied for four years by the Nazis, and
yet this occupation did not lead to a decline in the value of franc. Like its cousin the French franc, the
Swiss franc too would have continued to flourish as well under German as under Swiss rule.
Therefore, a voluntary Swiss surrender to the Germans would not have necessarily undermined the
nation's currency and shortened the war.
Claim Two: The Swiss army's proposed guerilla style warfare in the Alps would have made it
impossible for the Germans successfully to invade Switzerland as they did flat, geographically
unprotected France, Belgium and Holland. The Swiss could have held out forever against the Nazis in
their mountains, and kept their independence, too. The Swiss were therefore cowards who could have
refused to sell money to the Nazis and kept their independence if they had only been willing to fight
for their rights.
Of all the unfair charges which have been levied against the Swiss Confederation in recent
years, this is the most ludicrous. Swiss guerilla style mountain warfare would have made it only
impossible for the Nazis to take the impregnable Alpine fortresses occupied by Swiss troops which
had been planned by General Guisan. However, despite this token Swiss resistance in the remote Alps,
the Nazis could and would have easily occupied the flat Swiss plateau between Geneva and Zurich
where most of Swiss industry and all its banking operations are located. Even Stephen Halbrook, who
has written the most optimistic and accurate account of Swiss wartime military strength, concedes that
the Nazis would have quickly overrun this Mittelland region if an invasion had occurred. Considering
the extremely high priority the Nazis accorded to their Swiss banking transactions, if they had
invaded Switzerland and Swiss patriots had mounted resistance in the fortified mountains, the Nazis,
operating in accordance with typical German efficiency, would simply have divided the country into
two zones: an occupied zone on the plain where the Germans would have done business as usual,
separated from the belligerent mountainous zone by a blockade of Panzer tanks, fortifications and
camps. The Nazis would have tolerated General Guisan's token mountain autonomous military state
as long as his forces did not interfere with their economic activities on the plain. Had the Swiss forces
attempted to retake their cities on the plain such as Zurich and Basel, the Nazis would simply have
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wiped out the relatively small advancing Swiss army using their typical Blitzkrieg technique, which
would have worked as well in the flat environs of Zurich or Basel as in London or Warsaw.
We must attribute the Swiss preference for a policy of appeasement instead of this resistance
plan to God's infinite mercy and mysterious ways, for Swiss mountain military resistance against the
Nazis would have been the most stupid blunder of the war. At best, it would have created a
Switzerland divided into two zones, a peaceful, yet enslaved, economically productive zone working
for the Nazis much like the Nazi labor camps in Poland, and a token autonomous Swiss state like
Vichy France; at worst, it would have lead to a Nazi war of vengeance against all non-banking areas
of Switzerland and the loss of much innocent life. In any event, the Swiss army could never have
prevented the Nazi takeover of the Swiss banking centers by simply retiring into the mountains and
leading surprise raids on the Nazis, as General Guisan was planning to do. The Nazis were determined
to have the Swiss francs. As long as the Swiss government complied with this request, Berlin was
willing to leave Switzerland in peace, but had the Swiss Confederation rebelled and refused to send
the regular tribute of Swiss cash to Berlin, Berlin would have found extraordinary, punitive and
violent means to force the small nation into submission to its wishes.
It now behooves us to draw a logical conclusion concerning the sale of Swiss francs to the
Nazis, which has generated such a cry of international indignation in recent years. A Swiss refusal to
participate in financial dealings with the Nazis would have been totally unacceptable to Berlin, given
the high priority Berlin accorded to this particular source of income. A vast amount of scholarship
verifies that the Swiss franc was absolutely indispensable for Nazi wartime operations. German
reaction to such a hypothetical Swiss refusal to cooperate would have been a swift, Blitzkrieg type
invasion of Switzerland, similar to the invasion of Holland, designed to force the Swiss army back into
the Alps and to maintain a German occupied zone in all Swiss financial centers: a pace Napoleon.
The sale of Swiss francs to the Nazis was therefore a practical necessity and in fact

awise decision,

under the circumstances, for the refusal to sell the Swiss francs would have precipitated an
unnecessarily violent Nazi invasion of the country which would have simultaneously terminated its
independence and its ability to protect refugees and to assist Allied intelligence operations. An
equally vast amount of scholarship testifies to the fact that these Swiss Allied espionage centers were
indispensable ingredients in the ultimate Allied victory. Thus the Allied war effort would clearly have
been impaired and the lives of many refugees endangered by the futile Swiss resistance to the Nazis
in the financial sphere.
The Settlement of Holocaust Victims' Bank Accounts

We now must broach the third serious ethical question related to Swiss conduct during and
after the Second World War: Why did the Swiss banks delay the settlement of the Holocaust victims'
bank accounts for fifty-three years? Such conduct is clearly inexcusable, as the zeal with which the
Swiss government has sought to rectify this problem during the past three years makes evident.
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Until the spring of 1994 the Swiss bankers had for decades argued that the matter was closed,
settled for good by the 1962 law on the question of assets held in Switzerland that had belonged to
Holocaust survivors, which had registered sFr. 9.5 million ($7 million) in dormant accounts (Lebor
13). At that time, prompted by Jewish agencies and the state of Israel, the Swiss Bankers Association
had ordered its members to search for deposits abandoned by Holocaust victims; only 26 of 500
banks had actually responded to the appeal (Sancton 41). These funds_ had been returned to their
owners, the rest was parceled out to Jewish organizations and to the Swiss Refugee Aid Society. The
matter was closed, Swiss bankers believed. In addition, much of the vanished Jewish treasure had long
since made its way from Switzerland to other countries. Many assets were transferred by refugees
during or after the war and re-invested in safer countries or in their new countries of residence.
Armin Arnold has testified, for example, that his father, Franz Arnold, the supervisor of the Jewish
internee camps in Switzerland, handled the transfer of many Jewish assets from Germany. over
Switzerland, to the United States between 1933 and 1939. In 1940 alone, the United States received
21 billion francs worth of assets from Europe.
The Allies were themselves also responsible for the failure to properly restore assets to the
victims of the Holocaust. Two documents from the records of the Tripartite Gold Commission,
declassified. in April, 1997 by the American National Archives, demonstrate that nearly fifty tons of
Nazi gold in the possession of the commission had been confiscated from Jewish and non-Jewish
civilians (Mascaro, Les Allies 6). Nonetheless, the Commission had refused to return this gold to its
rightful owners in the course of its 1946 deliberations, an error of judgement first publicly revealed at
the London Conference on Nazi Gold in December, 1997. 4
Yet the issue of unrecovered Jewish wartime assets would not go away. In 1994 the Swiss
Bankers' Association decided to launch a general study, i.e. one not specifically focused on Holocaust
victims' assets, of accounts that had been dormant for over ten years, and appointed a banking
ombudsman to act as a clearing house between claimants and the banks. A year later, as the pressure
increased from the World Jewish Congress to identify dormant Holocaust accounts, the Swiss Bankers
Association began a second study, specifically targeted at identifying possible assets belonging to
Holocaust victims. This second study unearthed . $32 million in 775 dormant accounts which had been
opened prior to 1945 and about which there had been no communication since 1985. 562 of these
accounts totaling sFr. 31.6 million had been opened by depositors from areas once ruled by Nazi
Germany, although all the funds had not necessarily been deposited by Jews. All of which begged the
ethical question: Why had the bankers found only $7 million in 1962 and then, 34 years later,
managed to locate another sum of over $32 million?
On September 12th, 1995 board members of the Swiss Bankers' Association met in Bern with
Edgar Bronfman, head of the World Jewish Congress, and his assistant, Israel Singer. For the first time
4

At the London conferenceon Nazi gold in December 1997, Switzerland was one of the few countries which was
willing to give press conferences, proving its sincere desire to discover the full truth about its wartime activities.
Other countries which gave press conferences in London were Poland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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these bankers revealed to the two American Jewish businessmen the discovery of the $32 million in
the 775 dormant accounts and proposed turning over the funds to the World Jewish Congress,
although it remained unclear to what extent those assets actually belonged to victims of the Holocaust,
suggesting that that would close the matter for good. Singer responded by showing the Swiss bankers
for the first time at the Bern meeting sample documents from the recently opened Safehaven trove
proving the long term wartime cooperation between the Swiss banks and the government of the Third
Reich. For his part, Mr. Bronfman was deeply offended because the Swiss bankers had failed to offer
him a chair and because he found the settlement to be far too low. His response to this incivility and
injustice was to go to Washington and have lunch with New York Senator Alfone d'Amato. When
Bronfman told him about the Swiss bankers' stalling, D'Amato offered public hearings by his Senate
Banking Committee to resolve the matter.
The quiet war yielded to public battles, and Bronfman was not finished enlisting political
help. On April 8th, 1996, a day before he was to testify at D'Amato's hearing, Bronfman invited
Hillary Rodham Clinton to his Manhattan apartment for a fund-raising lunch. That morning, New
York Magazine had published a story on the search for Jewish money in Swiss banks. Bronfman
ripped the pages out and gave them to the First Lady. Understandably extremely upset, he requested
and received an appointment with President Clinton at the White House the following day. After the
Jewish leader had described the Swiss bank issue to the President, Mr. Clinton looked pensive and
replied, "Edgar, if it is necessary, I will work with Senator D'Amato on legislation on this matter"
(McGeary 40). Moving fast, the President ordered Secretary Eizenstat to investigate the U.S.
Archives. With the ammunition Singer and D'Amato had dug out of the Safehaven trove, emotional
Senate hearings in April and October, 1996 matched testimony from Holocaust survivors with hard
evidence of Swiss service to the Reich.
The Swiss bankers had their first opportunity to publicly defend their position on April 23rd,
1996. On that date, in his testimony to the Senate Banking Committee, Hans Baer of Bank Julius Baer
explained the rationale behind the Swiss bankers' decision to review and to correct the 1962
investigation of dormant accounts. The 1995 probe had a wider mandate than the 1962 law, Baer
explained. This 1995 process was intended to be as inclusive as possible so that any assets of
Holocaust victims that might have escaped identification pursuant to the 1962 law would now be
identified. According to the new procedure, the Swiss Bankers' Association required that its members
identify all assets deposited by non-Swiss nationals before the end of World War II, unless the banks
had evidence of activity since that time. The 1962 law had included a requirement to prove that the
owner of the assets had actually been persecuted by the Nazis, but the 1995 investigation did not
require claimants to prove that the account holder had been thus persecuted. Secondly, under the new
regulations, the banking ombudsman would also assume the task of serving as liaison between
claimants of Holocaust victims' accounts and the banks. The rules for claimants would be laxer than
in other countries. The ombudsman was charged to help claimants, especially the elderly and those
who are not in possession of much information, to prepare their claims and to transmit information to
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the banks. The standard for submitting such a claim is now significantly more permissive than the
general legal standard applicable in Switzerland and the United States. If a claimant can be matched
with assets identified by a bank, the bank has the obligation to contact the claimant (Lebor 15).
The following month, May 2nd, 1996, considerable progress toward a resolution of the
dilemma was made when the Swiss Bankers' Association and Jewish organizations agreed to set up a
joint commission to search through the banks' records for lost Holocaust accounts, under the
chairmanship of Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the US Federal Reserve. Each side had three
people on the panel and used independent auditors to go through the banks' books to search for lost
Jewish accounts and to recover any remaining funds.
On December 12th, 1996 both Houses of the Swiss Parliament voted for a bill to create a
commission of experts with a much wider and more complicated mandate: its brief was thoroughly to
examine the tangled network of financial connections that bound the Swiss economy into the Nazi
economy (Maissen 6). Any relevant information the Experts Commission found concerning dormant
accounts or heirless assets, were to be passed to the Volcker Commission. The Experts Commission
had to report back to the Swiss Parliament by 2001. That the bill was passed unanimously shows that
across Swiss society there is today a genuine desire to discover the truth about the country's wartime
history (Lebor 301).
The process of reconciliation between the Jews and the Swiss Confederation was briefly
interrupted by a series of misunderstandings erupting between December, 1996 and February, 1997
which likewise threatened to seriously damage relations between Switzerland and the United States.
First, in December, 1996, outgoing Swiss Federal President Jean-Pascal Delamuraz accused the
American Jewish Lobby of "ransom and blackmail" and charged that Switzerland's detractors were
seeking to "demolish its financial center." Delamuraz was angered by a report about Swiss diplomat
Thomas Borer's December 9th, 1996 meeting in New York City with World Jewish Congress leaders
who had threatened nine specific anti-Swiss reprisals unless the government set up a $250 million
Holocaust fund within two months. Secondly, on the night of January 9th, 1997, occurred the
notorious Meili scandal. Christoph Meili, a devout young Swiss Protestant who believed that God led
him to the documents, discovered in a shredding room at the main office of the Union Bank of
Switzerland two carts full of documents pertaining to Swiss dealings with Germany during the
1940' s. He gave some of the documents to a Swiss Jewish organization, which then handed them over
to the police. Meili was suspended from his job by the private security firm that employed him, and
Union Bank President Robert Studer accused Meili of ulterior motives for bringing this information
to the public's attention and insisted that no Holocaust related documents had been destroyed.
Nevertheless, Studer admitted that the shredding was a serious mistake. Studer, whom a Swiss court
found to have defamed Meili by publicly suggesting ulterior motives for his conduct, now bemoans
the incident as a catastrophe for his bank's credibility.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2021

21

24

Swiss American Historical Society Review, Vol. 35 [2021], No. 1, Art. 3

Thirdly, again in January, 1997 the Swissambassador to Washington, Carlo Jagmetti, resigned
after the publication of a leaked memorandum urging his government to "wage war" against
allegations that the Swiss banks had failed to account for the missing funds.
Finally, in early February, 1997 Swiss-American relations rapidly deteriorated when New
York lawmakers proposed kicking Swiss banks out of the state if they failed to open their books to
local auditors searching for Jewish accounts (McGeary 40). New York's governor warned that Swiss
banks could lose their operating licenses in the state, and the state comptroller halted overnight
deposits in Swiss banks. New York's city council threatened to bar official deposits in Swiss banks
until Holocaust victims were compensated. On February 4th, 1997, the United States, Britain and
France froze the distribution of $68 million in gold bars they were still holding from the Nazi hoard.
It was the last portion of the spoils retrieved by the Allies after the war and was supposed to be
parcelled out to the remaining nations that claim it. Edgar Bronfman advised President Clinton to
s~spend any action until the three Allies had decided whether this gold, symbolically at least, was
melted down from private Jewish assets rather than from national treasuries and should therefore go
to Holocaust victims.
When the Big Three Swiss banks finally announced the Holocaust Memorial Fund on
February 5th, 1997, the strain on Swiss-American relations was considerably relieved. Senator
D'Amato applauded the announcement as "an important step" in the right direction, and Israel Singer
at the World Jewish Congress praised the decision as "a new sign of entente cordiale."
Since that date the process of restoration of assets to the victims and relatives of victims of the
Holocaust by the Swiss banks has rapidly accelerated. Under the impeccable leadership of then Swiss
ambassador to the United States, Thomas Borer, the International Conference on the Recovery and
Return of Dormant Holocaust-Related Swiss Bank Accounts took place on December 8th, 1997 in
New York. This meeting was important because some of the comptrollers and treasurers at the
conference had begun to consider imposing sanctions against Swiss banks in their respective cities
and states. The main result of the conference was the adoption of a moratorium on all punitive
measures against Switzerland until March 31st, 1998.
Apart from hearing the Swiss government's firm opposition to such sanctions, those attending
the conference heard that the United States government strongly opposed such measures. The CFD's
of the American branches of Swiss banks and Ambassador Borer also took advantage of this
conference to acquaint the public with the steps Switzerland has been taking recently in an effort to
provide satisfactory answers to the numerous questions pertaining to Swiss involvement in the Second
World War. These include: an historical review of Switzerland's role as a financial center during the
war, conducted by the Bergier Commission; a comprehensive forensic audit of all Swiss banks carried
out by the Volcker Committee, along with the publication of all unclaimed accounts dormant since
1945; the launching of a humanitarian fund, initially endowed with $200 million, to alleviate the
distress of needy survivors.
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On August 12th, 1998, the Swiss banks' final financial settlement with the Jewish people was
formally announced on the evening news across the United States: the Swiss Bankers' Association had
consented to grant $1.25 billion in assistance to Jewish victims and the relatives of Jewish victims of
the Holocaust.

General Conclusion

The Swiss Confederation provided an island of refuge for 295,000 refugees in the midst of the sea of
European political and social chaos between 1939 and 1945. It gave asylum to 29,000 Jewish
refugees seeking to escape the Holocaust. In addition, the Swiss Parliament in Bern behaved
admirably during this historical period: its policies were characterized by a sincere effort to
implement the practice of traditional Swiss humanitarianism, combined with an effort to treat the Nazi
government in Berlin with sufficient diplomatic tact and sensitivity to prevent a German invasion of
Switzerland. Above all, the Swiss Parliament's wartime policies were dictated by its determination to
preserve Swiss independence, so that the Confederation might continue to protect the innocent and
persecuted who had sought asylum within its borders. Initially excessively influenced by the advice of
its principal advisor on refugee affairs, Heinrich Rothmund, who recommended an isolationist,
restrictive policy blocking the entry of refugees into the country, the Swiss Parliament showed itself to
be remarkably open to the simultaneous enlightenment offered by its principal ethical and spiritual
mentors, Karl Barth, Gertrud Kurz, Paul Vogt and Edgar Bonjour, who appealed for giving assistance
to all refugees reaching the Swiss border. In this instance the Swiss Parliament demonstrated its
deference to the ideals of Christian ethics by taking to heart Swiss theologians' appeal for pity for the
refugees, by treating refugees with greater fairness and sensitivity between August 23rd, 1943 and the
war's conclusion, and by making an explicit appeal in February, 1943 to the various cantonal
governments to provide lodging and assistance to all needy refugees. We have further seen that the
notorious rejection of 30,000 Jewish refugees was dictated by eighteen cantons' refusal to cooperate
with Bern in providing assistance to these dreadfully persecuted people.
The Swiss government and banks have recently been much criticized in the press for their
decision to sell Swiss francs for looted Nazi gold. Albeit a reprehensible decision, the sale of Swiss
francs to the Nazis was a necessity: it was the only means whereby the militarily disadvantaged Swiss
government in those awful times could bargain with the Nazis, the only means whereby it could
manage to guarantee the autonomy of their extremely threatened state. Such autonomy was a
prerequisite for the Swiss Confederation's ability to continue to uphold without hindrance its
historical humanitarian commitment to the persecuted~ it was also a prerequisite for the Swiss
government's ability to assist Allied espionage activities against the Nazis.
Clearly the court of world opinion must exonerate the Swiss Confederation on the issue of its
financial transactions with the Nazis. These transactions were unavoidable necessities for the
maintenance of the Swiss nation's ability to offer protection to refugees on Swiss soil. The only other
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choice open to the wartime Swiss government was to refuse to participate in financial dealings with
Berlin, a foolish decision which would have precipitated an automatic annexation of Switzerland to
the Third Reich and the surrender of thousands of refugees who had found asylum in Switzerland to
the Nazi genocide, as well as the termination of all Allied relief and espionage operations in free
Switzerland.
What then is the great lesson to be learned from the actions taken by the Swiss Confederation
during the Second World War: that all citizens within a state must be taught to love, to respect and to
practice the ideals of general and Christian ethics. Indeed, such ethical instruction should be the
utopian state's highest priority. Why, for example, did the members of the Swiss Parliament draw the
conclusion in the summer, fall and winter of 1942-43 that they had to reverse government policy and
give all refugees asylum? They did so because they were listening to and reading daily the advice of
the most learned, kindest theologians of the time. They thereby obtained ethical, as well as political,
competence.
Why did the governing officials of eighteen Swiss cantons refuse aid to 30,000 desperate Jews
in February, 1943? They were able to justify such an abhorrent refusal because they were ethically
incompetent. Indeed, they were ethically ignorant, as the finding of widespread Swiss anti-Semitism in
the 1935 Emmentaler report makes evident. Had these Swiss politicians and magistrates at the local
cantonal level been exposed to all the moral teaching of the Swiss wartime ethical Renaissance in the
nation's capital, they would have understood as well as their peers in Bern the paramount importance
of finding homes for these 30,000 refugees, regardless of the financial hardships involved. They
would have possessed the ethical knowledge requisite to overcome their selfishness and make the
correct ethical decision in this matter. Unfortunately, because they were deprived of daily ethically
informed discourse and because of their consequent lack of ethical understanding, they made a
wrong, eternally regrettable, decision.
In recent years some Swiss historians and politicians have rightly sought to dispel the
misconceptions concerning their country's role in the Second World War, caused by the slander and
libel which have been too often disseminated via televised debates and press articles. They have
justified with eloquence and erudition their nation's actions during the war. Others have sincerely
sought to compensate for the callousness of some members of their grandparents' generation toward
refugees by establishing charitable foundations. At present, for example, the -Swiss government is
preparing, for a plebiscite for the year 2000, the creation of a Swiss Foundation of Solidarity, to be
endowed with several billion dollars, which would have as its purpose the relief of human suffering
around the globe. Like their Swiss colleagues, American scholars and politicians today likewise
willingly confess the serious wartime errors committed by their own grandparents' generation: the
American government's decision to turn back the boats carrying Jewish passengers seeking asylum in
the United States, the ill advised decision to freeze Swiss assets in the United States in 1941, the Allied
failure to bomb the railway lines leading to Auschwitz, Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibor, Chelmno and
Maydanek, the sometimes excessively harsh treatment of German and Japanese prisoners of war, and
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the excessively careless bombing of German cities, including the terrible fire bombing which
devastated Dresden in February, 1945.
The Swiss people, like all victims of slander and libel, have every right to be profoundly
outraged by the false press and media accusations that they willfully profited from the plight of the
Jewish people during and after the second World War. The best historical research has proven
conclusively that Swiss banks' actions during the war were dictated exclusively by international law
and the necessity to preserve a stable national economy. Swiss bankers never pocketed unclaimed
deposits from the wartime era; Swiss law expressly forbids such unethical practices. Those accounts
continue to exist and are still available to legitimate claimants and their heirs. The federal law of
December 12th, 1996 establishing the Experts Commission is clear regarding this point: members of
the Commission are directed by this law to inform immediately the Swiss government of the
discovery of any bank accounts or assets remaining in Switzerland today belonging to victims of the
Holocaust and to return these funds to their rightful owners or their legal heirs. The law further opens
up automatically all public and many hithertofore private records in the country to the nation's
wartime conduct, for scrutiny by independent experts, in an effort to assist optimally the survivors
and the heirs of the victims of Nazi persecution. Historical research has also revealed that the national
Parliament in Bern did its very best in the winter of 1942-43 to persuade the local cantons to accept
refugees from the Third Reich. Moreover, various Swiss national officials have recently confessed,
and apologized for, the errors of judgment committed by the local Swiss civil servants responsible for
the failure to grant those refugees asylum.
Yet to deplore ad infinitum the grave mistakes of the Second World War is an exercise in
futility. Let us rather turn out attention to the future and seek the legal means to teach our children to
become not only linguistically and mathematically, but also ethically competent citizens. In the
opening pages of this article we demonstrated that the wartime Swiss national state exemplified so
powerfully goodness that it was able to triumph over the evil Nazi empire surrounding it on all sides;
·.....

we now venture to suggest that a truly optimal Swiss state at the dawn of the twenty-first century could
help the other nations to make evil obsolete by means of education. If the people of the Swiss
Confederation are truly repentant and wish to demonstrate to the world that they sincerely regret the
errors their grandparents made during the Holocaust, the individual cantons should formulate laws
making the study of general and Christian ethics mandatory for all Swiss school children in the
eighth grade and again in the last year of high school before entering university.
As the cantonal governments and Parliament in Bern consider the wisdom and advisability of
this law, they should remember three exceedingly important points: First, Karl Barth, who of all
members of the Swiss wartime generation wrote most prolifically and spoke most eloquently in
defense of the rights of refugees, attributed his extraordinary capacity for compassion to the training
he had received from Wilhelm Herrmann, a professor of ethics in the faculty of theology at the
University of Berlin. Barth often stated that he had been more profoundly influenced by Professor
Herrmann than by any of his other teachers; indeed, on the day the began his ministry in Geneva, five
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minutes before he was to go up into the pulpit, the post brought him the new, fourth edition of
Herrmann's Ethics, which the author had sent him and which Barth regarded as a symbol of the ideal
goals toward which he should dedicate his career (Busch 52). Secondly, the ante-helium German and
Swiss society which produced the sublime mind of Thomas Mann was essentially a theocentric
society; Mann's ancestors and parents were distinguished, pious Lutheran merchants who insisted that
their children attend the Lutheran church in Ltibeck regularly. Some of Mann's teachers in
elementary school were candidates for the Lutheran divinity degree. Biblical allusions permeate
Mann's literary works. This happy, urbane world, which produced so many artistic, literary and
scientific minds with incomparable sensitivity to the exquisite and the sublime, was profoundly
dedicated to the salutary ideals of the Christian Church. This ante-bellum Germanic society's Ftihrer
was the Christ. Swiss lawmakers at the dawn of the twenty-first century should carefully consider the
contrast between the favorite summertime activity of this former compassionate Germanic society
governed by a constitutional monarchy - attendance at sermons, church socials and pastoral
conferences all over Germany and Switzerland - with the favorite summertime activity sponsored by
the illegitimate Hitlerian Nazi regime between 1933 and

1944:

attendance at racist mass

demonstrations designed to brainwash German youth with visions of their racial superiority over
obstensibly worthless non-German Untermenschen, such as the Jews. These lawmakers will surely
perceive that the descent of Germany into the Nazi madness was a direct consequence of the decline
of ethical education there after Hitler's rise to power in 1933. Nazism was in essence the murder of
ethics. Thirdly and lastly, the governments of the Swiss cantons and the Parliament in Bern should
meditate upon the fact that, had _Adolf Hitler himself received as a child the ethical education
proposed in the present work, he never would have resorted to the persecution and annihilation of
European Jewry but rather would have sought to help the Jews of Europe, much like Casimir the
Great, the fourteenth century Christian Polish king who was a truly great friend of the Jewish people
and encouraged Jews to immigrate into his country. There are clearly many compelling reasons for
the government of the Swiss Confederation to advocate the introduction of ethics into its national
educational curriculum.
The great theologians at the University of Basel would gladly assist the cantonal governments
and the Swiss Parliament in the creation, implementation and instruction of this course in ethics. The
Parliament should really create a commission, similar to the Bergier Commission, with the mandate to
work with the theologians of Basel and Freiburg in order to devise an optimal textbook, an optimal
syllabus, and an optimal process of examination for this course. The extraordinary consequence of
such a law would be a guarantee that the Swiss humanitarian tradition would become a genuine
reality, that no refugee would ever again be denied asylum in the Swiss Confederation and that all
Swiss schoolchildren would be trained to treat their families, friends and guests with unprecedented
hospitality, generosity and kindness. Like Orpheus' legendary lyre, this dual course in ethics would
tame the beasts lurking in the dark side of man, would deter students from depraved and criminal
conduct, and would encourage them to devote their energies to the optimal practice of their respective
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professions and to the support of community interest in the sciences and the arts. The graduates of
these courses would impress all who met them to such an extent that their acquaintances would want
to emulate their spiritual perfection. In other words, their goodness would become contagious. Even
Switzerland's historically incorrigible neighbor, Germany, would quickly perceive the rightness of this
program of ethical education and would itself pass laws implementing similar ethics courses in its own
schools curriculum. The globe would then sigh with relief as it beheld Germany ruled, not by the
dictates of ignorant Nazi lunatics, but rather by the advice of the sublime New Testament and the wise
and compassionate theologians of Gottingen and TUbingen.
The Swiss Confederation has taken an important step in this direction by deferring to world
opinion and establishing $1.25 billion in aid to the victims and the relatives of the victims of the
Holocaust. Let it now consummate this process by deferring to the salutary dictates of ethics and
making the study of this vital academic discipline the law of the land. Once these courses have proven
their value for national welfare within the Confederation, let Swiss ambassadors then approach the
United Nations, present to the delegates of other nations evidence of the extraordinary worth of these
courses in ethics, and exhort their peers in diplomatic circles to suggest the implementation of similar
courses in ethics in their own countries. By this means the Swiss Confederation will establish a
pedagogical model in the field of ethics for other states to emulate and for which other states will be
forever grateful and will best fulfill its historical mission to guide the nations in their search for
lasting international peace.
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